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ABSTRACT 
We find that managers receive more risk-taking incentives in their compensation 
packages once their firms are referenced by credit default swap (CDS) trading, particularly 
when institutional ownership is high and when firms are in financial distress. These findings 
provide suggestive evidence that boards offer pay packages that encourage greater risk taking 
to take advantage of the reduced creditor monitoring after CDS introduction. Further, we 
show that the onset of CDS trading attenuates the effect of vega on leverage, consistent with 
the threat of exacting creditors restraining managerial risk appetite. 
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1. Introduction 
Credit default swaps (CDSs) have been credited as one of the most influential and 
controversial innovations in global financial markets in recent decades.2 The presence of 
CDS facilitates risk sharing and alleviates credit supply frictions (Saretto and Tookes, 2013). 
However, it also separates creditors’ control rights from cash flow rights, giving rise to 
potential moral hazard problems (Bolton and Oehmke, 2011). The literature has mostly 
focused on how CDSs affect the creditor–debtor relation and thereby impact corporate 
financial decisions. Little attention has been devoted to the role of managerial incentives in a 
firm’s transition associated with the onset of CDS trading. This scarcity may seem surprising 
given that corporate decisions are made by managers who often have their own interests. Our 
paper helps shed light on this issue. 
Managers with undiversified human capital are typically risk-averse (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Holmström, 1999). Given that CDS trading is associated with tougher 
renegotiations and a higher probability of bankruptcy (Bolton and Oehmke, 2011; 
Subrahmanyam et al., 2014), it remains unclear why, after CDS trade initiation, reference 
firms’ managers choose more aggressive financial policies to further increase firm risk, such 
as the higher leverage documented by Saretto and Tookes (2013). One possible explanation is 
that these managers are incentivized to increase risk taking through more convex 
compensation schemes. The convexity here refers to the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock 
return volatility, or vega. A higher vega makes risk more valuable to managers, encouraging 
riskier firm policies (Coles et al., 2006; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Gormley et al., 
2013). We investigate this possibility. 
                                                 
2 A CDS contract is between a protection buyer and a protection seller. The protection buyer pays a premium 
(commonly referred to as the CDS premium) to the protection seller. In exchange, the protection buyer receives 
a payment from the protection seller if a credit event (e.g., a credit rating downgrade, restructuring, or 
bankruptcy) occurs on a reference credit instrument within a predetermined time period. However, while a 
traditional insurance contract typically offers coverage only for damages incurred by the protection buyer, a 
CDS contract can be “naked” meaning it provides payment in case of a credit event, even if the protection buyer 
has no underlying credit exposure (Bolton and Oehmke, 2013). 
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More precisely, this paper asks whether managers receive more risk-taking incentives 
in their compensation packages, as measured by vega, once their firms are referenced by CDS 
trading. Moreover, note that risk-taking behavior is also determined by managerial risk 
appetite, that is, managers’ willingness to take risk with a given level of risk-taking 
incentives, which could vary as a function of the firm’s decision environment. For instance, it 
could be the case that managers become more reluctant to pursue risky strategies following 
the onset of CDS trading, despite an increase in incentive provision. To gain a better 
understanding of the CDS effect on risk-taking behavior, we also investigate whether CDS 
trading influences managerial risk appetite for a given level of vega.  
Considering the existing evidence of more aggressive financial policies in the post-CDS 
period, we posit that CDS trading is positively related to CEO vega. Our theoretical 
underpinning is based on the literature examining the effect of CDS on creditors’ incentives 
to engage in costly monitoring. Shareholders have an incentive to expropriate debtholder 
wealth by shifting to riskier investments, a phenomenon commonly referred to as risk shifting 
(Fama and Miller, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In the context of the traditional 
creditor–debtor relation, lending institutions, especially banks, continuously monitor 
borrowers to alleviate moral hazard (Fama, 1985; Diamond, 1991; Rajan, 1992). In 
particular, lenders scrutinize their borrowers’ managerial compensation packages to deter 
potential risk-shifting behavior, and impose stringent financial covenants and terms to 
constrain borrowers’ compensation policies.3  
                                                 
3 For example, Daniel et al. (2004) show that higher levels of CEO vega are associated with higher bond credit 
spreads, suggesting that the bond markets understand and account for the effect of incentives on risk taking. 
Billett et al. (2010) find that bondholders experience negative abnormal returns when firms announce new CEO 
option grants. Further, Brockman et al. (2010) document a positive relation between CEO vega and short-term 
debt, implying that creditors adjust debt maturity to restrain managerial risk seeking in response to an increase 
in CEO vega. In a similar vein, Castro et al. (2016) find that an increase in CEO vega leads to a greater 
concentration of the firm’s debt structure. More concentrated debt structures facilitate creditor monitoring by 
mitigating free-rider and coordination problems (Diamond, 1991; Sufi, 2007). 
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CDS availability significantly alters the creditor–debtor relation. Protection from a CDS 
contract limits the downside exposure of creditors, providing them with greater bargaining 
power in renegotiation (Bolton and Oehmke, 2011). Accordingly, CDS-protected creditors 
may find it more efficient to rely on pre-specified credit events to trigger renegotiation or 
default payment and shift away from costly monitoring (Morrison, 2005; Parlour and Winton, 
2013). The reduced creditor monitoring may provide borrowing firms with more 
opportunities to increase risk-taking incentives in compensation to better align managerial 
incentives with shareholder interests. In sum, we expect that boards offer pay packages that 
encourage greater risk taking in response to the post-CDS decline in creditor monitoring 
intensity.4 
To test this hypothesis, we exploit variation in the timing of CDS trade initiation and 
examine whether CEO vega changes around the event. The main finding from this analysis is 
that the inception of CDS trading on a firm is associated with an increase in the vega of the 
firm’s CEO, after controlling for standard determinants of managerial incentive 
compensation. In particular, our baseline regressions include firm and CEO–firm fixed 
effects to absorb any time-invariant unobserved characteristics at the firm or CEO–firm levels 
that could affect compensation policies. The positive effect of CDS introduction on vega is 
also economically significant. For example, in a specification with CEO–firm fixed effects, 
we find that vega increases by 29.1% following the onset of CDS trading. This finding is not 
driven by unobserved CEO traits or endogenous CEO–firm matching. Moreover, an 
                                                 
4 We acknowledge another possible explanation for why CEO vega would increase after CDS introduction 
based on managerial risk aversion. CDS-protected creditors can be tougher during debt renegotiation, making 
borrowers more vulnerable to bankruptcy. Anticipating tougher renegotiation, and taking into account 
significant personal costs of corporate bankruptcy (Eckbo et al., 2016), CEOs make more conservative operating 
and investing decisions to avoid defaults and covenant violations once their firms are referenced by CDS 
trading. For example, CEOs might be more reluctant to invest in risky projects even when those projects have 
positive net present values. To prevent excessive CEO conservatism at the expense of value maximization, 
boards may provide additional risk-taking incentives following CDS introduction to offset the potential increase 
in managerial risk aversion. However, we do not focus on this risk aversion explanation for two reasons. First, 
risk aversion is largely unobserved, which limits our ability to test this explanation explicitly. Second, this 
explanation is hard to reconcile with the findings of our split sample analysis based on institutional ownership, 
although we are careful to recognize that our analysis does not allow us to rule out this alternative explanation. 
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examination of the timing of the CDS effect suggests that the reference firm adjusts the risk-
taking incentives embedded in managerial compensation only after the initiation of CDS 
trading. Thus, the data reveals no contemporaneous or reverse patterns. 
A potential concern with the interpretation of our baseline results is that CDS 
availability is likely to be endogenous. Unobservable factors correlated with both managerial 
compensation and the selection of firms for CDS trading could bias the results. Alternatively, 
CDS trading may be initiated when market participants anticipate greater risk taking by 
managers with convex incentive schemes. We conduct two tests to address these concerns. 
First, we employ a matching approach and examine the changes in CEO vega from the year 
before to the years after CDS introduction relative to the changes in a matched sample of 
non-CDS firms. We find a substantial increase in the vega of reference firms’ CEOs near 
CDS introduction, compared with matched non-CDS firms. 
Second, we adopt the instrumental variable (IV) approach and two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) regression analysis. We use three instrumental variables, initially proposed by Saretto 
and Tookes (2013) and Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), as a source of exogenous variation in 
the likelihood of CDS trading: i) the foreign exchange hedging positions of lenders and bond 
underwriters, ii) the Tier 1 capital ratios of lenders and bond underwriters, and iii) Trade 
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) coverage. On the one hand, these instruments 
are economically sound because they are associated with the overall hedging interest of 
lenders or credit suppliers. Consistent with this view, we find that they are significant 
determinants of CDS trading. On the other hand, it also appears that they are uncorrelated 
with borrowers’ managerial compensation policies, except through their impact on CDS 
market activities. Overall, the results confirm that introducing CDS trading on a firm has a 
positive effect on the vega of the firm’s CEO. 
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We next explore the heterogeneity in the effect of CDS trade initiation on CEO vega. If 
the vega effect is associated with creditor monitoring, then the increase in vega following 
CDS introduction should be more prominent when shareholders have stronger motives to take 
advantage of the reduced creditor monitoring and to offer pay packages that encourage 
greater risk taking. We identify two settings where firms’ incentives to exploit the 
opportunity created by the post-CDS decline in creditor scrutiny are likely to be strong. First, 
prior literature suggests that institutional investors have the ability and incentives to influence 
CEO compensation decisions (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Almazan et 
al., 2005). Thus, the boards of firms with larger institutional holdings are more likely to act in 
the interests of shareholders and design managerial compensation packages accordingly. 
Second, financially distressed firms may have greater risk-shifting incentives, which could 
manifest in increased convexity in CEO compensation (Eisdorfer, 2008). Consistent with the 
creditor monitoring view, our results show that the increase in vega is concentrated among 
borrowers that are financially distressed and those with larger institutional holdings.  
Finally, to investigate whether CDS trading has any impact on managerial risk appetite, 
we examine the effect of CDS introduction on the relation between leverage and vega. 5 CDS-
protected creditors are likely to be more intransigent in renegotiation, triggering bankruptcy 
that can impose significant personal costs on managers (Bolton and Oehmke, 2011; 
Subrahmanyam et al., 2014). If, for a given level of risk-taking incentives, managers tend to 
avoid renegotiation with exacting creditors by making more conservative financial decisions 
after CDS introduction than before, then we would expect CDSs to reduce the sensitivity of 
leverage to vega. The results are mainly twofold. First, consistent with prior studies (Coles et 
al., 2006; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Gormley et al., 2013), we generally find that a 
                                                 
5 We are particularly interested in firms’ capital structures because both vega and CDS trading have been 
documented to impact leverage (see, e.g., Coles et al., 2006; Saretto and Tookes, 2013; Li and Tang, 2016); in 
contrast, the predictions on the relation between CDS introduction and corporate investment decisions, and 
between CDS and firm risk are ambiguous. 
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higher CEO vega is associated with higher leverage. Second, we show that CDS introduction 
attenuates the positive relation between vega and leverage, suggesting that CDSs pose a 
potential threat to managers and thereby restrain their risk taking. Taken together, these 
findings appear to suggest that, when making leverage decisions, risk-averse managers 
balance the exacting creditor threat and convex incentive schemes. Their motives to avoid 
renegotiation with exacting creditors partially offset the increased risk-taking incentives 
embedded in compensation packages, resulting in a reduced sensitivity of leverage to vega 
following the onset of CDS trading. 
The primary contribution of our study is in providing evidence that CDS trade initiation 
on a firm’s debt influences the firm’s managerial compensation policies because it alters 
contractual parties’ payoffs and incentives. In particular, we find that managers receive more 
risk-taking incentives in their compensation contracts once their firms are referenced by CDS 
trading. This finding adds to the strand of compensation literature that investigates the design 
or determination of managerial incentive contracts (Low, 2009; Hayes et al., 2012; Cohen et 
al., 2013; Gormley et al., 2013). 
Our study also helps illuminate how managers balance the increased risk-taking 
incentives arising from the decreased creditor monitoring and their reduced risk appetite due 
to the exacting creditor threat when making leverage decisions. The results suggest that, 
although the initiation of CDS trading on a firm leads to an increase in the vega of the firm’s 
CEO, it also lowers the sensitivity of leverage to vega. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our sample, 
model specification, and summary statistics. Section 3 presents our main empirical results 
regarding the effect of CDS on CEO vega. Section 4 examines the impact of CDS on the 
relation between vega and firm leverage. Section 5 discusses alternative explanations of the 
results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. Data and empirical specification 
2.1. Data 
We are interested in the impact of CDS trading on the CEO’s incentive contracts. Our starting 
point to construct the sample is the universe of nonfinancial firms over the period 2002–2014 
in the ExecuComp database that provides CEO compensation information.6 Year 2002 is the 
first year that CDS quote data is available from Bloomberg. 2014 is the last year for which 
we have information on CEO vega. We then expand this information to include CDS quote 
data from Bloomberg, also used by Saretto and Tookes (2013) and Das et al. (2014). As 
noted by Saretto and Tookes, Bloomberg quote data captures firms with substantial CDS 
trading activities and allow for the sufficiently broad dissemination of contractual 
information to develop an impact. Given the over-the-counter nature of CDS contracts, we 
use the first CDS trading date in our sample as the CDS introduction date and explore 
changes in CEO vega following CDS trade initiation.  
Moreover, we obtain firm-level financial data from Compustat, stock price information 
from CRSP, corporate governance variables from RiskMetrics, bank debt information from 
Capital IQ, and institutional investor ownership data from the Thomson Reuters Form 13F 
database. All accounting variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles to mitigate 
the potential impact of outliers. Observations with missing values for the variables employed 
in the regressions are excluded. The final sample includes firms in the intersection of these 
databases, consisting of 9,176 firm–year observations for 1,387 unique firms. During the 
sample period, we identify 132 firms that have CDS trading initiated on their debt and 961 
firm-years in which CDS contracts are trading. 
 
                                                 
6  Our main dependent variable, CEO vega, is obtained from Coles et al. (2006), who construct the variable 
using the ExecuComp data. The data is available at http://sites.temple.edu/lnaveen/data/. 
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2.2. Baseline empirical specification 
We use panel regressions to examine the effect of CDS trading. The fully specified baseline 
empirical model is the following: 
𝐿𝑛(1 + 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎)𝑖,𝑡 =  + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑖 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 ∙ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
(1) 
The dependent variable is the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility, or Vega, a 
common measure of managerial risk-taking incentives. Specifically, it is defined as the 
change in the value of the CEO’s wealth due to a 0.01 increase in the annualized standard 
deviation of the firm’s stock return (Coles et al., 2006).  
Another plausible measure of risk-taking incentives is CEO option grants, computed as 
the natural logarithm of one plus option compensation. However, options have ambiguous 
implications for risk. On the one hand, options increase in value with firm risk. Their convex 
payoff structure creates an incentive to take risk because managers share in the gains but not 
all of the losses. On the other hand, options increase the sensitivity of a risk-averse CEO’s 
wealth to the underlying stock price, weakening the CEO’s risk-taking incentives (Carpenter, 
2000; Ross, 2004). In addition, option compensation increases wealth, which may alter risk 
tolerance. Together, the overall net effect of option compensation on risk taking is not clear a 
priori and depends upon the level of CEO wealth, the degree of diversification in a CEO's 
personal portfolio, and the risk-aversion parameter, among others (Guay, 1999).  
By contrast, the effect of vega on risk taking is theoretically unambiguous because vega 
is a measure of convexity. Increases in vega should increase the convexity of the CEO’s 
wealth-performance relation, leading to more risk taking. Empirically, Coles et al. (2006), 
Chava and Purnanandam (2010), Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012), and Hayes et al. (2012) 
all examine the association between vega and risk taking, and find a positive relation.  
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The focus of this paper is on the convexity of a CEO’s personal portfolio and its 
unambiguous effect on risk taking around CDS introduction, which is different from the 
theoretically ambiguous net effect of option compensation. Therefore, our main measure of 
risk-taking incentives is vega. We also use CEO option compensation as an alternative 
measure. Our finding of the post-CDS increase in risk-taking incentives is robust to this 
alternative measure, consistent with options being an important source of pay-risk sensitivity. 
Following Saretto and Tookes (2013) and Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), our main 
variable of interest CDS trading is an indicator variable that equals one for a CDS firm after 
the inception of the firm’s CDS trading and zero prior to it. This variable allows us to exploit 
the variation in the timing of CDS introduction to estimate the impact of the availability of 
CDS contracts on CEO vega. 
Control stands for a set of determinants of the CEO’s incentive contracts and potential 
confounders, following the previous literature on the design of CEO incentive compensation 
(Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009; Hayes et al., 2012; Custódio et al., 2013; Bakke et al., 2016). 
First, we control for firm characteristics, including firm size, measured as the natural 
logarithm of sales (Ln(Sales)); profitability, measured as both the return on assets (ROA) and 
stock returns (Stock return); growth opportunities, measured as Tobin’s q (Tobin’s q); and 
firm risk, measured as stock return volatility (Volatility); bank-loan dependency, measured as 
the bank debt indicator (Bank debt); and firm financial distress risk, measured as both Z-score 
and KZ index. In particular, Z-score is constructed based on the Z-score model of Altman 
(1968), and KZ index is an index following the work of Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
Moreover, the CEO characteristics that we control for include age (Age), tenure 
(Tenure), an indicator of whether the CEO is female (Female CEO), and the level and 
structure of compensation packages (Ln(Total pay), Equity mix, and Ln(1 + Delta)). Finally, 
to account for the potential impact of corporate governance on the design of managerial 
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compensation, we include the fraction of independent directors on boards (Board 
independence), the fraction of shares owned by institutional investors (Institutional 
ownership), and the entrenchment index (E Index) compiled by Bebchuk et al. (2009). 
Throughout the empirical analysis, the explanatory variables are lagged by one period 
relative to the dependent variable to alleviate potential endogeneity problems. Appendix A 
provides detailed variable definitions. 
To further mitigate unobserved heterogeneity in our estimates of the effect of CDS 
trading on vega, we use a set of fixed effects. First, we include industry–year fixed effects, 
denoted Industry ∙ year. This inclusion ensures that we are comparing CDS and non-CDS 
firms within the same industry at the same point in time, allowing us to difference away 
unobserved changes in industry conditions. In addition, we control for firm fixed effects, 
denoted Di, to remove unobserved time-invariant differences between CDS and non-CDS 
firms. In more stringent specifications, we replace firm fixed effects with CEO–firm fixed 
effects to absorb any unobserved CEO and firm heterogeneity that is fixed during the tenure 
of a given CEO. Using the latter fixed effects, we can observe within-CEO–firm variation, 
that is, the change in the vega of the same CEO working for the same firm for multiple years 
during which the firm initiates CDS trading. This setting increases the likelihood that any 
difference in CEO vega is due to the onset of CDS trading. 
Although we control for a broad set of firm, CEO, and governance characteristics and 
use a variety of fixed effects, unobserved time-varying factors, such as a major shift in the 
firm’s corporate strategy, could still be driving our results. To mitigate any remaining 
endogeneity concerns, we employ two approaches, including a matching analysis and an IV 
approach, which are discussed in more detail below. 
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2.3. Descriptive statistics 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our baseline analysis. The 
dependent variable Vega has a mean value of $188,925, which is comparable to the reported 
mean of $149,453 in Table 1 of Hayes et al. (2012). The mean option compensation is 
$1,677,698. In 10.5% of the firm–years, CDS contracts are trading. An average firm in our 
sample has a sales revenue of $7.908 billion, a return on assets of 14.1%, a Tobin’s q of 
1.813, a stock return of 13.8%, stock return volatility of 0.343, a Z-score value of 0.068, a KZ 
index value of 1.981, institutional ownership of 77.5%, a fraction of independent directors of 
75.9%, and an E-index value of 2.567. In addition, 2.6% of the CEOs are female. The 
average CEO is 56 years old, has a tenure of seven years and a total compensation of $5.978 
million, 66.9% of which is equity-based compensation. The summary statistics for our 
controls are consistent with those reported by Hayes et al. (2012), Custódio et al. (2013), 
Fernandes et al. (2013), Bakke et al. (2016). 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Comparing the CDS and non-CDS samples in Table 2 provides useful insights. 
Compared to non-CDS firms, CDS firms offer much stronger risk-taking incentives in 
managerial compensation. On average, CEOs at CDS firms gain $412,424 when there is a 
0.01 increase in the firm’s stock return volatility, more than twice as much as the 
corresponding gain of $162,780 for CEOs at non-CDS firms. In addition, the mean option 
compensation for CEOs at CDS firms is $2,678,599, whereas it is $1,560,612 for those at 
non-CDS firms. Further, CDS firms are larger and show lower performance in terms of 
Tobin’s q. 
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3. CDS trading and the sensitivity of CEO wealth to firm risk 
3.1. Changes in managerial risk-taking incentives and firm leverage around CDS 
introduction 
Before the multivariate regression analysis, we examine the validity of our main 
hypotheses at the univariate level. We first sort our sample into CDS (treatment) and non-
CDS (control) firms and into periods around CDS introduction. Then we compare the main 
outcome variables, including risk-taking incentive measures and firm leverage, over time and 
across treatment and control groups. To mitigate any bias introduced by firms self-selecting 
into CDS and non-CDS status, we match treatment firms to control firms that have similar 
characteristics. 
Specifically, we define the year of CDS trade initiation as event year t and require CDS 
firms and their potential control firms to have non-missing data on the outcome variables 
from year t - 1 to year t + 1 and from year t - 1 to year t + 2, respectively, depending on the 
event window used. We construct a control sample of non-CDS firms based on propensity 
scores one year prior to CDS introduction. Propensity scores are obtained by estimating a 
logit model of the likelihood of CDS trading where the independent variables include all the 
control variables in our baseline model, as well as industry and year fixed effects. Each CDS 
firm is matched to a non-CDS firm with the closest propensity score. To ensure that CDS 
firms and their matched control firms are sufficiently indistinguishable, we require that the 
maximum difference between the propensity score of a CDS firm and that of its matched 
control firm does not exceed 0.01 in absolute value. Eventually, we identify matches for 77 
firms with CDS trade initiation during the sample period.7 
                                                 
7 One potential concern is that if CDS contracts on underlying borrowers are not actively traded upon CDS 
availability, then the effect of CDS trading would be called into question. To rule out this concern, we compare 
our sample CDS firms to the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) universe in terms of CDS 
trading activity. DTCC is a dataset that contains transaction level data on credit derivatives. Its coverage 
amounts to 95% of single-name CDSs based on the number of contracts, and 99% of single-name CDSs with 
respect to notional amounts (See Gehde-Trapp et al., 2015, for a more detailed description of this dataset). 
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Insert Table 3 about here 
We perform a diagnostic test to verify that the treatment and matched control firms are 
indistinguishable. The results presented in Appendix B suggest that, in the matched sample, 
the two groups are balanced across observable characteristics and no significant differences 
remain. 
The first four columns of Table 3 present the means and average changes of the two 
risk-taking incentive measures for the periods around CDS introduction. On average, 
treatment firms experience increases in CEO vega and option compensation after the onset of 
CDS trading. By contrast, the average changes for control firms are negative. As a result, the 
differences in the changes between CDS and matched control firms for both event windows 
are positive and significant, indicating that the positive effect of CDS trading on risk-taking 
incentives is likely to be persistent.  
The observed decline in pay convexity and option compensation in the post-treatment 
period for non-CDS firms may reflect the fact that the change in the accounting treatment of 
stock options following the implementation of the Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 
123R in 2005 has subsequently reduced the attractiveness of options. Under the new 
regulation, firms are required to expense executive stock options at fair value, which results 
in a significant cutback in option pay, reducing the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return 
volatility (Hayes et al., 2012; Bakke et al., 2016).8 While it is not the focus of this paper to 
examine how the accounting treatment of stock options affect their use, it does evoke the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Untabulated results suggest that, on average, our sample CDS firms have larger transaction amounts and higher 
numbers of traded contracts, mitigating the concern about infrequent transactions.  
8 Prior to the implementation of FAS 123R, firms were allowed to expense stock options at their intrinsic value. 
Since nearly all firms granted stock options at-the-money, no expenses for option-based compensation were 
reported on the income statement. FAS 123R required firms to begin expensing option-based compensation at 
its fair value, thereby eliminating accounting advantages associated with stock options. Consequently, firms 
significantly reduced their usage of option-based compensation after the adoption of FAS 123R. 
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importance of using a control sample of non-CDS firms to filter out this time trend in order to 
draw accurate inferences, which we do.  
The remaining columns of Table 3 report the results for book leverage and market 
leverage. Consistent with Saretto and Tookes (2013), we observe a positive role for CDSs in 
affecting leverage decisions. The differences in changes between CDS and matched control 
firms are positive and statistically significant for both the t - 1 to t + 1 and t - 1 to t + 2 
horizons, suggesting that firms with traded CDS contracts on their debt are able to maintain 
higher leverage ratios. 
 
3.2. Impact of CDS trading on managerial risk-taking incentives 
In Panel A of Table 4, we establish the empirical relation between CDS trading and 
CEO vega. Columns (1) and (2) present the results of firm and CEO–firm fixed effects 
models, respectively. In both specifications, the coefficient estimates for CDS trading are 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that CDS trade initiation has a 
positive effect on vega.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
The economic magnitudes are also substantial. For example, the coefficient of CDS 
trading in the CEO–firm fixed effect specification in column (2) of Panel A Table 4 is 0.291, 
which implies that vega increases by 29.1% following the onset of CDS trading. This result is 
not driven by unobserved CEO traits, providing additional confidence for a causal 
interpretation of our findings. Absorbing unobserved CEO heterogeneity also addresses the 
concern that endogenous CEO–firm matching could bias our results. 
Another potential concern about the interpretation of our baseline results pertains to 
reverse causality: if, observing firms’ managerial compensation decisions, creditors initiate 
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hedging contracts and CDS markets emerge, then our results would be driven by reverse 
causation. To rule out this possibility, we perform additional empirical analyses to examine 
the dynamics of the CDS effect. Specifically, we replace CDS trading with a set of four 
dummy variables indicating the year prior to CDS introduction (CDS trading-1), the year of 
CDS introduction (CDS trading0), the first year after CDS introduction (CDS trading+1), and 
two or more years after CDS introduction (CDS trading≥+2). If our results are affected by 
reverse causation, the likelihood of CDS trading might already be correlated with CEO vega 
before the inception of CDS trading. In that case, we should observe a positive and 
significant coefficient for CDS trading-1. 
The results in columns (3) and (4) of Panel A alleviate concerns about reverse causation 
or pre-existing trends since, in both specifications, the coefficients of CDS trading-1 are 
insignificant. Interestingly, we find that the coefficient of CDS trading0 is also insignificant 
and the coefficients of both CDS trading+1 and CDS trading>=+2 are positive and statistically 
significant. These results indicate that it is only one year after the initiation of CDS trading 
that the positive effect on vega becomes large and significant. Overall, these findings suggest 
that the observed effect of CDS trading on Vega does not reflect reverse causation. 
In Panel B of Table 4, we repeat the regressions in Panel A using CEO option pay as an 
alternative measure of risk-taking incentives. We find a positive relation between CEO option 
pay and the initiation of CDS trading, indicating that CEOs receive more option 
compensation in the post-CDS period. The patterns in columns (3) and (4) of Panel B suggest 
that the observed positive relation cannot be explained by reverse causation. 
 
3.3. Robustness checks 
We conduct a number of tests to ensure the robustness of our baseline results. First, we 
find similar results when we remove the 2007–2008 crisis period from our sample. Second, 
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we exclude firms that had never been referenced by CDS trading from the sample and find 
qualitatively the same results. Third, we test whether the results are robust to alternative 
clustering and industry classifications. The regressions in Table 4 include industry–year fixed 
effects based on the Fama–French 49 industry classifications, with standard errors clustered 
by firm. We confirm that our findings are robust to the two-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) and the three-digit North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) industry classifications, the exclusion of industry–year fixed effects, clustering by 
industry and year, and double clustering by industry and year. 
Moreover, one might be concerned that the results are driven by the changes in 
accounting rules imposed by FAS 123R. To the extent that industry–year fixed effects and a 
control sample of non-CDS firms capture trends in compensation practices and relevant 
accounting requirements over time, this concern is mitigated. Nevertheless, we reestimate our 
baseline specifications after limiting the sample to the pre-FAS 123R period (i.e., end the 
sample period in 2004). The positive CDS effect on vega remains, albeit less significantly so. 
 
3.4. Instrumental variables approach 
To address the concern of any remaining time-varying unobserved heterogeneity across 
firms or CEOs affecting our results, we use the instrumental variables approach to extract the 
exogenous component of CDS trading and use it to explain CEO vega. As sources of 
exogenous variation, we use three instrumental variables initially proposed by Saretto and 
Tookes (2013) and Subrahmanyam et al. (2014). First, Lender FX Hedging is the average 
notional amount of foreign exchange derivatives used for hedging purposes, relative to total 
assets, across the banks that have served as either lenders or bond underwriters for our sample 
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firms over the previous five years.9 Second, Lender Tier 1 Capital is the average Tier 1 
capital ratios across the banks that have served as either lenders or bond underwriters for our 
sample firms over the previous five years. We use the Tier 1 capital ratio data from the 
Compustat bank files to construct this instrument. Third, TRACE Coverage is the number of 
bond issues of a firm that have been covered by TRACE. These instruments should be 
economically sound because they are associated with the overall hedging interest of lenders 
or credit suppliers. For example, prior literature suggests that lenders with larger hedging 
positions are more likely to trade the CDSs of their borrowers (Minton et al., 2009), and that 
banks with lower capital ratios have greater incentives to hedge the credit risk of their 
borrowers using CDSs (Subrahmanyam et al., 2014, 2017). In addition, Subrahmanyam et al. 
(2014) indicate that the likelihood of CDS trading increases after the implementation of 
TRACE. Meanwhile, the instruments we use are expected to be uncorrelated with CEO vega, 
except through their impact on CDS trading. As evidence that this condition is likely to hold, 
we add the instruments to the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of vega both 
separately and together and find that they are not significant. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Column (1) of Table 5 presents the results of the first-stage regression, where the 
dependent variable is CDS trading. We add the most stringent set of fixed effects that 
includes both CEO-firm and industry-year fixed effects. We find that the coefficient 
estimates for the instruments have the expected sign and are frequently significant. We then 
conduct two additional tests to verify their validity. First, we test the joint significance of the 
                                                 
9 Following Saretto and Tookes (2013) and Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), to construct the variable, we first 
identify the lenders and bond underwriters for our sample firms based on data from DealScan and Bloomberg. 
We then supplement this information to include data on the foreign exchange derivative positions of these 
lenders and bond underwriters, obtained from the bank regulatory data set. In our sample, the mean (standard 
deviation) of Lender FX Hedging is 2.73% (2.41%), which is similar to the 1.85% (1.40%) reported by Saretto 
and Tookes. 
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three instruments and find that the values of the F-test are large and highly significant (p-
value < 0.001). Second, the p-values for Hansen’s (1982) J overidentification test are large 
(0.896), implying that the hypothesis that the instruments are valid cannot be rejected. 
Importantly, the second-stage regression results reported in column (2) show that CDS 
trading has a positive and significant impact on Vega after accounting for the potential 
endogeneity of managerial incentive contracts, confirming our prior results in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
3.5. Heterogeneity in the effect of CDS introduction on vega 
Our empirical analysis so far suggests a positive effect of CDS introduction on CEO 
vega. In this section, we explore whether this positive effect varies with the CEO’s firm’s 
risk-shifting incentives to shed further light on the mechanism through which CDS trading 
affects managerial incentive contracts. 
Table 6 presents the results. For brevity, we report only the coefficients of CDS trading, 
although the same set of control variables as in Table 4 is included. First, we split the sample 
based on whether a firm’s institutional ownership is above or below the sample median and 
estimate the vega regressions separately for firms with high and low institutional ownership. 
The results reported in columns (1) to (4) of Panel A show that the coefficients of CDS 
trading are positive and statistically significant in the high institutional ownership subsample, 
but insignificant in the low institutional ownership subsample. These findings suggest that the 
boards of firms with larger institutional holdings tend to act in the interests of shareholders by 
offering managers greater risk-taking incentives following a decline in creditor monitoring. In 
addition to the split-sample analysis, we interact CDS trading with Institutional ownership in 
columns (5) and (6) based on the whole sample. The coefficient on the interaction term is 
positive as expected in both specifications, supporting the results of the split-sample analysis 
(albeit one of them is statistically insignificant). 
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Insert Table 6 about here 
Second, we investigate whether the positive effect of CDS trading on vega is more 
pronounced in financially distressed firms. Eisdorfer (2008) indicates that financially 
distressed firms have stronger risk-shifting incentives. Thus, the managers of such firms 
might be motivated, via more convex incentive structures, to take greater risks after a 
decrease in creditor monitoring, particularly when their firms are closer to financial distress 
or operating under stringent financial constraints. To test this conjecture, we estimate the 
vega regressions separately for distressed and non-distressed firms. We use Z-score, proposed 
by Altman (1968), and KZ index, proposed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), to measure the 
severity of financial distress facing a firm. The lower (higher) the Z-score (KZ index), the 
more financially distressed or constrained the firm. The split-sample analysis results in Panels 
B and C of Table 6 show that, using both measures, the positive effect of CDS trading on 
vega is concentrated on financially distressed firms, consistent with our prediction. 
Interacting CDS trading with the financial distress measures, we find that the coefficient on 
the interaction term has the expected sign and is frequently significant across specifications, 
which confirms the split-sample analysis results. 
 
4. Managerial risk appetite and exacting creditors 
Next, we examine whether CDS trade initiation mitigates the impact of vega on firm 
leverage. CDS-protected creditors tend to be tougher in renegotiation, making distressed 
borrowers more vulnerable to bankruptcy (Bolton and Oehmke, 2011; Subrahmanyam et al., 
2014). Given the significant personal costs associated with corporate bankruptcy, risk-averse, 
rational CEOs may attempt to avoid renegotiation with exacting creditors by making less 
aggressive capital structure decisions. Therefore, the decline in managerial risk appetite due 
to the exacting creditor threat could offset the observed increase in risk-taking incentives 
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embedded in CEO compensation, resulting in a lower sensitivity of leverage to vega after the 
inception of CDS trading. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
We test this conjecture by including an interaction term between CDS trading and 
Ln(1 + Vega) in the leverage regressions. Table 7 presents the results. Using both book and 
market leverage, we find that the coefficients of CDS trading ×  Ln(1 + Vega) are negative 
and frequently significant, offsetting the positive baseline effect of vega on leverage. The 
reduced sensitivity of leverage to vega after CDS introduction suggests that the presence of 
CDS-induced exacting creditors reduces managerial risk appetite. 
 
5. Alternative explanations and discussion 
Another potential channel through which CDS markets may affect managerial risk-taking 
incentives is by revealing new information about firms. CDS spreads represent more timely 
and cleaner market information for equity risk premia that are not otherwise revealed 
(Friewald et al., 2014). If the additional information and thereby greater transparency make 
equity compensation more desirable, then the informational role of CDS markets could 
contribute to the observed increase in CEO vega in the post-CDS period. A further prediction 
is that the positive effect of CDS introduction on vega should be more pronounced for 
informationally opaque firms where the informational advantage of CDS markets are more 
important.  
To investigate whether the impact of CDS trading on vega varies with the transparency 
of firms, we consider three proxies for firm transparency: firm size, ln(Sales), defined as the 
natural logarithm of sales; Analyst coverage, defined as the number of stock analysts; and 
Number of segments, a measure of firm complexity, defined as the number of a firm’s 
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business segments. Informationally opaque firms are those that are smaller, or more complex, 
or have less analyst coverage. In untabulated tests, we sort firms into High and Low groups 
based on the median of each transparency measure and estimate our baseline regressions 
separately for High and Low subsamples. We also estimate vega regressions that include an 
interaction term between CDS trading and the transparency measures. Overall, the positive 
CDS effect is pervasive across firms with different levels of transparency, which contradicts 
the view that CDS trading and vega are related via the improved information environment 
following CDS trade initiation. 
Several prior studies report evidence that pay convexity increases the firm’s cost of 
capital because creditors understand and account for the effect of incentives on risk-taking 
(Daniel et al., 2004; Billett et al., 2010; Brockman et al., 2010). If boards are aware that pay-
risk incentives in managerial compensation affects cost of capital, then they may factor in this 
hidden, indirect cost of volatility sensitivity when setting pay, putting downward pressure on 
incentive provision. Therefore, this effect should work against finding a positive, significant 
impact of CDS trading on risk-taking incentives, suggesting that our results can be viewed as 
conservative estimates of the CDS-vega relation.  
Nevertheless, we conduct additional analyses and find that our main results are robust 
to including High refinancing needs and its interaction with CDS trading as additional 
controls, and to excluding firms with high refinancing needs. High refinancing needs is a 
dummy variable equals one if ST3 and Book leverage are above the sample median for that 
fiscal year and zero otherwise, where ST3 is the book value of the debt maturing within the 
next 3 years scaled by the book value of total debt. Debt maturity information is obtained 
from Capital IQ. In addition, we fail to find evidence that the relation between CDS trading 
and vega varies with firm refinancing needs. If our results are somehow driven by debt 
governance, then we would expect creditors of firms with high refinancing needs to have 
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greater impact on the borrowing firm’s incentive provision. We do not observe this 
heterogeneity in the CDS effect in our data.  
However, we wish to emphasize that these additional analyses do not allow us to 
completely rule out alternative interpretations in general. Rather, we argue based on our 
evidence that the relation between CDS introduction and vega is more consistent with the 
creditor monitoring explanation. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the impact of CDS trade initiation on reference firms’ 
managerial compensation policies. We find significant evidence that the introduction of CDS 
trading on a firm’s debt increases the vega of the firm’s CEO. This finding prevails even after 
we control for the potential endogeneity of the timing of CDS introduction using matching 
and IV estimation. In the cross-section, we show that the positive CDS effect on vega is 
stronger when institutional ownership is higher and when firms are in financial distress. 
These findings imply that boards offer pay packages that encourage greater risk taking to take 
advantage of the decline in creditor monitoring in the post-CDS period. Finally, we find that 
the onset of CDS trading attenuates the effect of vega on leverage, consistent with the view 
that CDS-induced exacting creditors pose a potential threat to managers and restrain their risk 
taking. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
This table presents the summary statistics for the variables used in our baseline analysis. Vega is defined as the 
change in the value of the CEO’s wealth due to a 0.01 increase in the annualized standard deviation of the firm’s 
stock return. Option pay is the CEO option compensation. CDS trading is an indicator variable that equals one 
for a CDS firm after the inception of the firm’s CDS trading and zero prior to it. Sales is the sales revenue. ROA 
is earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. Tobin’s q is the sum of total assets plus market value 
of equity minus book value of equity divided by total assets. Stock return is the annual returns over the past 
year. Volatility is the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock return over the past year. Age is the age of 
the CEO in years. Z-score is a measure of firm distress risk based on the Z-score model of Altman (1968). KZ 
index is an index of financial constraints proposed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Bank debt is a dummy 
variable equals one if the firm has bank debt, and zero otherwise. Book leverage is the sum of debt in current 
liabilities plus long-term debts and divided by total assets. Market leverage is the sum of debt in current 
liabilities plus long-term debts and dividend by firm value, where firm value is defined as book value of total 
assets plus market value of equity minus book value of common equity. Tenure is the number of years as CEO 
in the current position. Female CEO is a dummy variable equal to one if CEO is female, and zero otherwise. 
Delta is defined as the change in the value of the CEO’s wealth due to a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. 
Total pay is the total CEO pay, which consists of salary, bonus, restricted stocks, options, long-term incentive 
plans, and other compensation. Equity mix is the CEO equity pay divided by total pay, where equity pay is the 
sum of restricted stocks and options. Board independence is the fraction of independent directors on the board. 
Institutional ownership is the number of shares owned by institutional investors divided by total number of 
shares outstanding. E index is the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index. 
 
Obs. Mean Stdev 25% 50% 75% 
Vega (thousand $) 9176 188.925 348.391 22.501 82.202 216.658 
Option pay (thousand $) 9176 1,677.698 3,871.918 0.000 669.843 2,021.816 
CDS trading 9176 0.105 0.306 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sales (million $) 9176 7,907.888 23,519.970 844.082 2,061.625 6,068.784 
ROA 9176 0.141 0.074 0.094 0.133 0.181 
Tobin's q 9176 1.813 0.914 1.204 1.526 2.104 
Stock return 9176 0.138 0.393 -0.097 0.117 0.331 
Volatility  9176 0.343 0.184 0.215 0.298 0.422 
Z-score 9176 0.068 0.324 0.003 0.005 0.010 
KZ index 9176 1.981 3.284 0.455 1.362 2.678 
Bank debt 9176 0.739 0.427 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Book leverage 9176 0.237 0.150 0.125 0.232 0.334 
Market leverage 9176 0.161 0.125 0.066 0.140 0.235 
Age 9176 55.900 6.665 51.000 56.000 60.000 
Tenure 9176 6.750 6.667 2.000 5.000 9.000 
Female CEO 9176 0.026 0.158 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Delta (thousand $) 9176 971.496 8,939.381 100.654 255.437 621.165 
Total pay (thousand $) 9176 5,978.463 6,851.350 2,073.629 4,084.310 7,436.689 
Equity mix 9176 0.669 0.242 0.556 0.750 0.850 
Board independence  9176 0.759 0.138 0.667 0.778 0.875 
Institutional ownership 9176 0.775 0.171 0.672 0.790 0.889 
E index 9176 2.567 1.232 2.000 3.000 3.000 
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Table 2 
Univariate analysis 
 
This table compares the means and medians of firm, CEO and governance characteristics for firm-years with CDS contracts and those without. The total number 
of observations is 9178. All variables are defined in Appendix A. t-tests (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests) are conducted to test for differences in the means 
(medians). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  CDS  Non-CDS  Differences 
 Mean Median   Mean Median      Mean   Median 
Vega (thousand $) 412.424 261.039  162.780 73.083  249.644 *** 187.955 *** 
Option pay (thousand $) 2,678.599 1,753.738  1,560.612 600.545  1,117.987 *** 1,153.193 *** 
CDS trading 1.000 1.000  0.000 0.000  1.000 *** 1.000 *** 
Sales (million $) 30,089.320 15,259.000  5,313.078 1,792.400  24,776.242 *** 13,466.600 *** 
ROA 0.143 0.139  0.140 0.133  0.002 
 
0.006 * 
Tobin's q 1.664 1.459  1.830 1.534  -0.165 *** -0.075 *** 
Stock return 0.133 0.122  0.139 0.116  -0.006 
 
0.006 
 Volatility 0.284 0.249  0.350 0.304  -0.066 *** -0.056 *** 
Z-score 0.023 0.004  0.073 0.005  -0.050 *** -0.001 *** 
KZ index 2.463 1.722  1.924 1.313  0.538 *** 0.410 *** 
Bank debt 0.758 1.000  0.732 1.000  0.026  0.000  
Book leverage 0.271 0.257  0.233 0.227  0.038 *** 0.029 *** 
Market leverage 0.179 0.166  0.159 0.135  0.019 *** 0.031 *** 
Age 56.522 57.000  55.827 56.000  0.695 *** 1.000 *** 
Tenure 5.875 5.000  6.852 5.000  -0.977 *** 0.000 ** 
Female CEO 0.050 0.000  0.023 0.000  0.027 *** 0.000 *** 
Delta (thousand $) 1,301.375 542.575 
 
932.906 231.313 
 
368.469 
 
311.262 *** 
Total pay (thousand $) 11,555.420 9,830.331 
 
5,326.065 3,709.263 
 
6,229.355 *** 6,121.068 *** 
Equity mix 0.767 0.844 0.657 0.736 0.110 *** 0.108 *** 
Board independence 0.802 0.833  0.754 0.778  0.048 *** 0.056 *** 
Institutional ownership 0.738 0.760  0.779 0.795  -0.041 *** -0.035 *** 
E index 2.477 2.000  2.577 3.000  -0.101 ** -1.000 *** 
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Table 3 
Changes in vega and firm leverage around CDS introduction 
 
 
This table presents univariate analysis of changes in vega and firm leverage before and after CDS introduction (year t - 1 to year t + 2) for CDS firms relative to 
their matched control firms. The matched sample of non-CDS firms is chosen based on propensity scores obtained from a logit model that estimates the 
likelihood of CDS trading. Ln(1+Vega) is the natural logarithm of one plus Vega, where Vega is the change (in thousands of dollars) the value of the CEO’s 
wealth due to a 0.01 increase in the annualized standard deviation of the firm’s stock return. ln(1+Option) is the natural logarithm of one plus the CEO’s option 
compensation. Book leverage is the sum of debt in current liabilities plus long-term debts and divided by total assets. Market leverage is the sum of debt in 
current liabilities plus long-term debts and dividend by firm value, where firm value is defined as book value of total assets plus market value of equity minus 
book value of common equity. We report the differences in changes for the CDS firms relative to their matched control firms with the closest propensity score. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Ln(1+Vega) 
 
Ln(1+Option) 
 
Book leverage 
 
Market leverage 
 Treat Control   Treat Control   Treat Control  Treat Control 
t - 1 5.429 5.147 
 
12.464 11.430 
 
0.267 0.291 
 
0.169 0.214 
t 5.430 4.941 
 
12.581 10.905 
 
0.271 0.284 
 
0.192 0.214 
t + 1 5.642 4.807 
 
12.662 9.931 
 
0.267 0.264 
 
0.174 0.186 
t + 2 5.586 4.936 
 
12.617 10.144 
 
0.260 0.249 
 
0.163 0.176 
                
Change from t - 1 to t + 1 0.212 -0.340 
 
0.198 -1.499 
 
0.001 -0.026 
 
0.005 -0.028 
Difference in changes: Treat-Control 0.552*** 
 
1.697* 
 
0.027* 
 
0.033** 
 
(0.166) 
 
(0.884) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.015) 
        
Change from t - 1 to t + 2 0.156 -0.211 
 
0.152 -1.286 
 
-0.006 -0.041 
 
-0.005 -0.038 
Difference in changes: Treat-Control 0.452*** 
 
1.439* 
 
0.035** 
 
0.033** 
 
(0.133) 
 
(0.803) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.015) 
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Table 4 
CDS trading and CEO’s incentive contracts 
 
This table examines the impact of the onset of CDS trading on risk-taking incentives in the CEO’s compensation 
packages. The dependent variable for Panel A is the natural logarithm of one plus Vega, where Vega is the change 
(in thousands of dollars) in the value of the CEO’s wealth due to a 0.01 increase in the annualized standard deviation 
of the firm’s stock return. The dependent variable for Panel B is the natural logarithm of one plus the CEO’s option 
compensation. The main variable of interest CDS trading is an indicator variable that equals one for a CDS firm 
after the inception of the firm’s CDS trading and zero prior to it. CDS trading-1, CDS trading0, CDS trading+1, and 
CDS trading≥+2 are indicator variables for the year prior to, the year of, the first year after, and two or more years 
after the CDS introduction, respectively. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. Industry-year fixed effects are 
constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classifications. Statistical significance is based on the 
heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significant at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. CDS trading and CEO vega  
 
Dependent variable: Ln(1+Vega) 
(1) (2)   (3) (4) 
CDS trading 0.328** 0.291*** 
 
— — 
 
(0.136) (0.110) 
   CDS trading-1  — — 
 
0.234 0.273 
    
(0.195) (0.182) 
CDS trading0 — — 
 
0.302 0.401 
    
(0.287) (0.248) 
CDS trading+1 — — 
 
0.389 0.519** 
    
(0.228) (0.239) 
CDS trading≥+2 — — 
 
0.586** 0.673*** 
    
(0.285) (0.254) 
Ln(Sales) 0.404* 0.012 
 
0.409* 0.019 
 
(0.218) (0.198) 
 
(0.218) (0.198) 
ROA -0.656 -0.439 
 
-0.674 -0.470 
 
(0.438) (0.384) 
 
(0.438) (0.384) 
Tobin's q -0.098** -0.063 
 
-0.097** -0.061 
 
(0.047) (0.039) 
 
(0.047) (0.039) 
Stock return -0.097** -0.069** 
 
-0.097** -0.070** 
 
(0.041) (0.035) 
 
(0.041) (0.035) 
Volatility 0.046 0.083 
 
0.042 0.077 
 
(0.113) (0.095) 
 
(0.113) (0.094) 
Z-score -0.023 -0.025 -0.022 -0.025 
 (0.063) (0.057)  (0.063) (0.057) 
KZ index 0.002 0.010*  0.002 0.010* 
 (0.006) (0.005)  (0.006) (0.005) 
Bank debt -0.047 -0.028  -0.048 -0.028 
 (0.048) (0.041)  (0.048) (0.041) 
Age -0.016** -0.015*** 
 
-0.016*** -0.015*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) 
 
(0.006) (0.005) 
Tenure -0.018** -0.029*** 
 
-0.018** -0.029*** 
 
(0.007) (0.006) 
 
(0.008) (0.006) 
Female CEO -0.182 0.135 
 
-0.186 0.131 
 
(0.212) (0.157) 
 
(0.213) (0.157) 
Ln(1+Delta) 0.403*** 0.292*** 
 
0.402*** 0.291*** 
 
(0.040) (0.035) 
 
(0.040) (0.035) 
Ln(Total pay) 0.083* 0.013 
 
0.084* 0.014 
 
(0.047) (0.038) 
 
(0.047) (0.038) 
31 
 
Equity mix 0.031 0.044 
 
0.030 0.043 
 
(0.121) (0.106) 
 
(0.121) (0.106) 
Board independence 0.556** 0.339* 
 
0.559** 0.343* 
 
(0.222) (0.196) 
 
(0.222) (0.195) 
Institutional ownership -0.082 0.061 
 
-0.082 0.060 
 
(0.220) (0.185) 
 
(0.219) (0.185) 
E index 0.012 -0.008 
 
0.012 -0.009 
 
(0.032) (0.027) 
 
(0.032) (0.027) 
Firm FE Yes No 
 
Yes No 
CEO-Firm FE No Yes 
 
No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
N 9176 9176 
 
9176 9176 
Adjusted R2 0.202 0.126 
 
0.202 0.127 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Using an alternative measure of managerial risk-taking incentives 
 
Dependent variable: Ln(1+Option) 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
CDS trading 1.469** 1.347** 
 
— — 
 
(0.705) (0.635) 
   CDS trading-1  — — 
 
-0.355 -0.449 
    
(1.011) (1.012) 
CDS trading0 — — 
 
0.668 -0.018 
    
(1.325) (1.248) 
CDS trading+1 — — 
 
1.207 1.698* 
    
(1.228) (1.025) 
CDS trading≥+2 — — 
 
2.098* 2.138** 
    
(1.221) (1.068) 
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No  Yes No 
CEO-Firm FE No Yes  No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 8987 8654  8987 8654 
Adjusted R2 0.073 0.081  0.073 0.082 
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Table 5 
Instrumental variables approach 
 
Table 5 presents estimates of the instrumental variables method using two-stage least squares (2SLS) panel 
regressions. The dependent variable is CDS trading and Ln(1+Vega) for the first- and second-stage regressions, 
respectively. CDS trading is an indicator variable that equals one for a CDS firm after the inception of the firm’s 
CDS trading and zero prior to it. Ln(1+Vega) is the natural logarithm of one plus Vega, where Vega is the change 
(in thousands of dollars) in the value of the CEO’s wealth due to a 0.01 increase in the annualized standard deviation 
of the firm’s stock return. The instrumental variables are as follows. Lender FX Hedging is constructed as the 
average notional amount of foreign exchange derivate contracts used for hedging purposes, relative to total assets, 
across all banks that have been identified as either leading lenders or bond underwriters for our sample firms over 
the previous five years. Lender Tier 1 Capital is defined as the average of Tier One capital across all banks that have 
served as either leading syndicate loan lenders or bond underwriters for our sample firms over the previous five 
years. TRACE covergae is defined as the total frequency of a firm’s corresponding bond issuance deals that are 
reported by the TRACE in year t. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Industry-year effects are 
constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the 
heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variables: 
 
  
CDS trading Ln(1+ Vega) 
First stage Second stage 
(1) (2) 
Lender FX Hedging, z1 0.180 — 
 
(0.162) 
 Lender Tier 1 Capital, z2 -0.637** — 
 
(0.319) 
 TRACE Coverage, z3 0.011*** — 
 
(0.003) 
 CDS trading — 2.827** 
  
(1.326) 
Ln(Sales) 0.033 -0.242 
 
(0.038) (0.278) 
ROA -0.020 -0.065 
 
(0.079) (0.673) 
Tobin's q -0.008 -0.085 
 
(0.010) (0.076) 
Stock return 0.004 -0.176** 
 
(0.014) (0.070) 
Volatility -0.038 0.226 
 
(0.037) (0.209) 
Z-score 0.004 0.070 
 (0.013) (0.101) 
KZ index 0.001 0.005 
 (0.001) (0.008) 
Bank debt -0.008 -0.014 
 (0.010) (0.069) 
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Age 0.000 -0.034*** 
 
(0.001) (0.010) 
Tenure -0.001 -0.008 
 
(0.002) (0.011) 
Female CEO -0.017 0.122 
 
(0.025) (0.275) 
Ln(1+Delta) 0.009* 0.272*** 
 
(0.005) (0.055) 
Ln(Total pay) -0.002 -0.043 
 
(0.010) (0.072) 
Equity mix 0.031 0.251 
 
(0.027) (0.196) 
Board independence 0.036 0.333 
 
(0.060) (0.332) 
Institutional ownership -0.137** 0.627* 
 
(0.061) (0.363) 
E index -0.003 -0.026 
  (0.007) (0.044) 
CEO-Firm FE Yes Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes 
N 3765 3765 
F-statistics (z1=z2=z3=0) 8.890*** — 
Hansen’s J test p-value — 0.896 
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Table 6 
Heterogeneity in the effect of CDS introduction on vega 
 
This table presents the heterogeneity in the effect of CDS introduction on CEO vega. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus Vega, where 
Vega is the change (in thousands of dollars) in the value of the CEO’s wealth due to a 0.01 increase in the annualized standard deviation of the firm’s stock 
return. Our main variable of interest CDS trading is an indicator variable that equals one for a CDS firm after the inception of the firm’s CDS trading and zero 
prior to it. We include the same set of control variables as in Table 4. The coefficient estimates for the control variables are suppressed for brevity. In each panel, 
we partition the sample based on whether the split variable is above or below the sample median. In addition to the split-sample analysis results, we report the 
results from estimating specifications that include interaction terms based on the whole sample. Institutional ownership is the number of shares owned by 
institutional investors divided by total number of shares outstanding. Z-score and KZ index are measures of financial distress based on Altman (1968) and Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997), respectively. Age is the age of CEO in years. Industry-year effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. 
Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Ln(1+Vega) 
Panel A:Based on institutional ownership  
 
High institutional ownership 
 
Low institutional ownership 
 
Whole sample 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
CDS trading 0.454** 0.342* 
 
0.328 0.205 
 
0.827* 0.399 
 
(0.176) (0.185) 
 
(0.208) (0.152) 
 
(0.451) (0.379) 
CDS trading × Institutional ownership — — 
 
— — 
 
0.655* 0.143 
       
(0.347) (0.298) 
Institutional ownership -0.520 -0.348 
 
0.758* 0.691* 
 
-0.047 0.068 
  (0.413) (0.316)   (0.423) (0.356)   (0.225) (0.187) 
All controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No 
 
Yes No 
 
Yes No 
CEO-Firm FE No Yes 
 
No Yes 
 
No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
N 4588 4588 
 
4588 4588 
 
9176 9176 
Adjusted R2 0.179 0.159   0.241 0.149   0.202 0.126 
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Panel B: Based on Altman Z-score 
 
High Z-score: Non-distressed 
 
Low Z-score: Distressed 
 
Whole sample 
 
(1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
CDS trading 0.200 0.100 
 
0.348** 0.503*** 
 
0.328** 0.294*** 
 
(0.163) (0.125) 
 
(0.167) (0.168) 
 
(0.137) (0.111) 
CDS trading × Z-score — — 
 
— — 
 
-0.070 -0.105* 
       
(0.048) (0.056) 
Z-score -0.058 -0.039 
 
29.022 1.205 
 
-0.023 -0.021 
  (0.071) (0.062)   (48.493) (44.062)   (0.065) (0.060) 
All controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No 
 
Yes No 
 
Yes No 
CEO-Firm FE No Yes 
 
No Yes 
 
No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
N 4588 4588 
 
4588 4588 
 
9176 9176 
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.103   0.272 0.189   0.202 0.126 
 
 
Panel C: Based on KZ index 
  High KZ index: Distressed 
 
Low KZ index: Non-distressed 
 
Whole sample 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
CDS trading 0.335* 0.370***   0.149 0.112   0.327** 0.290*** 
 
(0.186) (0.148) 
 
(0.228) (0.170) 
 
(0.137) (0.110) 
CDS trading × KZ index — — 
 
— — 
 
0.005* 0.006** 
       
(0.003) (0.003) 
KZ index 0.011 0.014 
 
-0.024 -0.010 
 
0.002 0.009* 
  (0.012) (0.009)   (0.029) (0.024)   (0.006) (0.005) 
All controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No 
 
Yes No 
 
Yes No 
CEO-Firm FE No Yes 
 
No Yes 
 
No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
N 4588 4588 
 
4588 4588 
 
9176 9176 
Adjusted R2 0.267 0.182   0.135 0.126   0.202 0.126 
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Table 7 
CDS trading and the relationship between CEO vega and leverage 
 
This table examines whether CDS trading affects the relationship between vega and leverage. The dependent 
variables are book leverage and market leverage. The former is defined as the sum of current liability and long-
term debt scaled by total assets. The latter is defined as the sum of current liability and long-term debt scaled by 
firm value, where firm value is the book value of total assets, plus the market value of equity, minus the book 
value of common equity. CDS trading is an indicator variable that equals one for a CDS firm after the inception 
of the firm’s CDS trading and zero prior to it. Ln(1+Vega) is the natural logarithm of one plus Vega, where 
Vega is the change (in thousands of dollars) in the value of the CEO’s wealth due to a 0.01 increase in the 
annualized standard deviation of the firm’s stock return. The other variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Industry-year effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical 
significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Dependent variable: Book leverage   Dependent variable: Market leverage 
 
(1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Ln(1+Vega) 0.001 0.002 
 
0.001 0.002* 
 
(0.001) (0.002) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Ln(1+Vega) × CDS trading -0.006** -0.002   -0.004** -0.003* 
 (0.003) (0.003)   (0.002) (0.002) 
CDS trading 0.040** 0.023 
 
0.023* 0.010 
 
(0.019) (0.017) 
 
(0.014) (0.013) 
Ln(Sales) 0.024 0.014 
 
0.060*** 0.060*** 
 
(0.016) (0.017) 
 
(0.012) (0.013) 
ROA -0.137*** -0.116*** 
 
-0.181*** -0.152*** 
 
(0.036) (0.036) 
 
(0.027) (0.028) 
Tobin's q -0.001 -0.002 
 
-0.014*** -0.013*** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Stock return -0.015*** -0.012*** 
 
-0.017*** -0.014*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) 
 
(0.003) (0.002) 
Volatility 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.012 
 (0.011) (0.010)  (0.009) (0.009) 
Z-score -0.031*** -0.023***  -0.013*** -0.008** 
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.003) 
KZ index 0.007*** 0.005***  0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Bank debt 0.009** 0.007*  0.007** 0.005* 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Age 0.001 0.001 
 
0.001 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.000) 
Tenure 0.001*** 0.001** 
 
0.001*** 0.001** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Female CEO 0.010 -0.009 
 
0.010 0.005 
 
(0.018) (0.017) 
 
(0.011) (0.008) 
Ln(1+Delta) -0.003 -0.005** 
 
-0.006*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Ln(Total pay) -0.010** -0.002 
 
-0.004 -0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
 
(0.003) (0.002) 
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Equity mix 0.016 -0.005 
 
0.004 -0.005 
 
(0.011) (0.010) 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
Board independence -0.026 -0.025 
 
-0.020 -0.015 
 
(0.016) (0.017) 
 
(0.012) (0.013) 
Institutional ownership 0.009 0.004 
 
0.001 0.001 
 
(0.017) (0.018) 
 
(0.014) (0.014) 
E index -0.001 0.001 
 
-0.001 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Firm FE Yes No 
 
Yes No 
CEO-Firm FE No Yes 
 
No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
N 9175 9175 
 
9175 9175 
Adjusted R2 0.165 0.156   0.263 0.250 
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Appendix A. Variable definition 
Variables Description Source 
Main variables 
Ln (1+Vega) Natural logarithm of one plus CEO vega, where vega is defined as the change in the 
value of the CEO’s wealth due to a 0.01 increase in the annualized standard 
deviation of the firm’s stock return. 
Execucomp;  
Coles et al. (2006) 
Ln (1+Option) Natural logarithm of one plus the CEO’s option compensation. Execucomp 
   
CDS trading Dummy variable that equals one for a CDS firm after the inception of the firm’s 
CDS trading and zero prior to it. 
Bloomberg 
   Firm characteristics 
  
Ln(Sales) Natural logarithm of sales.  Compustat 
ROA Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets Compustat 
Tobin’s q Sum of total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity divided 
by total assets 
Compustat 
Stock return Annual stock returns over the past year.   Compustat 
Volatility  Annualized standard deviation of monthly stock return over the past year. CRSP 
Z-score A measure of firm distress risk based on the Z-score model of Altman (1968). The Z-
score is computed as: 1.2 × (working capital/total assets) + 1.4 × (retained 
earnings/total assets) + 3.3 × (earnings before interest and taxes/total assets) + 0.6 × 
(market value of equity/book value of liabilities) + 0.999 × (net sales/total assets). 
Compustat 
KZ index An index of financial constraints based on the work of Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
The KZ index is computed as -1.002 × Cash flow/K + 0.283 × Tobin's Q + 3.139 × 
Leverage – 39.368 × dividends/K – 1.315 × cash holdings/K, where Cash flow is the 
sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation. K is the beginning of 
year capital defined as net property, plant & equipment. Tobin's Q is computed as the 
sum of total assets and the market value of equity less the sum of the book value of 
equity and deferred taxes, all divided by total assets. Leverage is the sum of long-
term debt and debt in current liabilities, divided by the sum of long-term debt, debt 
in current liabilities and total stockholders' equity. Dividends is the sum of common 
and preferred dividends. Cash holdings is the cash and short-term investments. 
Compustat 
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Bank debt A dummy variable that equals one if the firm has bank debt, and zero otherwise. Capital IQ 
Book leverage  Sum of debt in current liabilities plus long-term debts and divided by total assets.  Compustat 
Market leverage Sum of debt in current liabilities plus long-term debts and dividend by firm value, 
where firm value is defined as book value of total assets plus market value of equity 
minus book value of common equity.  
Compustat 
   CEO characteristics 
  
Age Age of CEO in years.  Execucomp  
Tenure Number of years as CEO in the current position.  Execucomp 
Female CEO A dummy variable that takes a value of one if CEO is female, and zero otherwise.   Execucomp 
Ln (1+Delta) Natural logarithm of one plus CEO delta, where delta is defined as the change in the 
value of the CEO’s wealth due to a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price.  
Execucomp; 
Coles et al. (2006) 
Ln (Total pay) Natural logarithm of CEO total pay, where total pay consists of salary, bonus, 
restricted stocks, options, long-term incentive plans, and other compensation. 
Execucomp 
Equity mix CEO equity pay divided by total pay, where equity pay is the sum of restricted stocks 
and options.  
Execucomp 
   Corporate governance variables 
  
Board independence Number of independent directors divided by board size. RiskMetrics 
Institutional ownership Number of shares owned by institutional investors divided by total number of shares 
outstanding. 
Thomson Reuters 
13F Holdings  
E index  Entrenchment index based on six antitakeover provisions: staggered boards, limits to 
shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority 
requirements for mergers and charter amendments. The index measures the number 
of antitakeover provisions in place. 
RiskMetrics; 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) 
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Appendix B 
Diagnostic test results for the propensity score matching approach 
 
The table reports the diagnostic test results for the propensity score matching approach employed in Table 3. 
Specifically, we report the univariate comparisons of firm characteristics between CDS firms and their matched 
control firms, as well as the corresponding 𝑡-statistics. Ln(Sales) is the natural logarithm of sales. ROA is the 
earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. Tobin’s q is the sum of total assets plus market value 
of equity minus book value of equity divided by total assets. Stock return is the annual returns over the past 
year. Volatility is the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock return over the past year. Age is the age of 
CEO in years. Tenure is the number of years as CEO in the current position. Female CEO is a dummy variable 
equal to one if CEO is female, and zero otherwise. Ln(1+Delta) is the natural logarithm of one plus Delta, 
where Delta is the change (in thousands of dollars) in the value of the CEO’s wealth due to a 1% increase in the 
firm’s stock price. Ln(Total pay) is the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation. Equity mix is CEO equity 
pay divided by total pay. Board independence is the fraction of independent directors on the board. Institutional 
ownership is the number of shares owned by institutional investors divided by total number of shares 
outstanding. E index is the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  CDS Firms    Control Firms   Differences t-statistics 
Ln(Sales) 6.948 
 
6.908 
 
0.039 0.427 
ROA 0.145 
 
0.145 
 
0.000 0.009 
Tobin's q 1.795 
 
1.678 
 
0.117 0.882 
Stock return 0.006 
 
-0.004 
 
0.011 0.171 
Volatility 0.341 
 
0.379 
 
-0.038 -1.273 
Z-score 0.007 
 
0.035 
 
-0.028 -1.445 
KZ index 2.642 
 
2.380 
 
0.262 0.477 
Bank debt 0.595 
 
0.662 
 
-0.068 -0.847 
Age 55.689 
 
56.932 
 
-1.243 -1.145 
Tenure 5.795 
 
4.597 
 
1.197 1.221 
Female CEO 0.027 
 
0.000 
 
0.027 1.424 
Ln(1+Delta) 6.258 
 
6.125 
 
0.133 0.756 
Ln(Total pay) 8.687 
 
8.782 
 
-0.095 -0.620 
Equity mix 0.640 
 
0.662 
 
-0.022 -0.553 
Board independence 0.718 
 
0.722 
 
-0.004 -0.154 
Institutional ownership 0.724 
 
0.696 
 
0.028 1.093 
E index 2.568 
 
2.446 
 
0.122 0.608 
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Table A.1 
Section 3.3. Robustness checks 
 
This table presents the results of the robustness checks discussed in Section 3.3 of the paper. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus Vega, where Vega is 
the change (in thousands of dollars) in the value of the CEO’s wealth due to a 0.01 increase in the annualized standard deviation of the firm’s stock return. For brevity, only 
the coefficient estimates on CDS trading are reported. CDS trading is an indicator variable that equals one for a CDS firm after the inception of the firm’s CDS trading and 
zero prior to it. All regressions include the same set of controls as in Table 4. Industry-year effects based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification are included unless 
otherwise stated. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level unless otherwise stated. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Dependent variable: Ln(1+Vega) 
  
 
Firm FE   CEO-firm FE 
(1) 
 
Exclude 2007 and 2008 crisis period from sample 
 
0.312** 
(0.151) 
 
0.225* 
(0.128) 
(2) 
 
Exclude firms never been referenced by CDS trading from sample  
 
0.378* 
(0.219) 
 
0.262* 
(0.146) 
(3) 
 
Industry-year FE based on the 2-digit SIC industry classification 
 
0.371** 
(0.151) 
 
0.264** 
(0.109) 
(4) 
 
Industry-year FE based on the 3-digit NAICS industry classification 
 
0.331** 
(0.160) 
 
0.207* 
(0.112) 
(5) 
 
Replace industry-year with year FE 
 
0.234* 
(0.113) 
 
0.263** 
(0.099) 
(6) 
 
Cluster by industry 
 
0.328** 
(0.152) 
 
0.291*** 
(0.088) 
(7) 
 
Cluster by industry and year 
 
0.328** 
(0.139)   
0.291** 
(0.098) 
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Table A.2 
Firm transparency and the relation between CDS introduction and vega 
 
This table examines whether firm transparency affects the relation between CDS introduction and CEO vega. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus 
Vega, where Vega is the change (in thousands of dollars) in the value of the CEO’s wealth due to a 0.01 increase in the annualized standard deviation of the firm’s stock 
return. Our main variable of interest CDS trading is an indicator variable that equals one for a CDS firm after the inception of the firm’s CDS trading and zero prior to it. We 
include the same set of control variables as in Table 4. The coefficient estimates for the control variables are suppressed for brevity. In each panel, we partition the sample 
based on whether the split variable is above or below the sample median. In addition to the split-sample analysis results, we also report the results from estimating 
specifications that include interaction terms based on the whole sample. Ln(Sales) is the natural logarithm of sales. Analyst coverage is the number of stock analysts. Number 
of segments is the number of a firm’s business segments. We collect analyst coverage data from the I/B/E/S database and business segment data from Compustat. Industry-
year effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard 
errors reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Ln(1+Vega) 
Panel A: Based on firm size 
        
 
Large firm  
 
Small firm 
 
Whole sample
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
CDS trading 0.461*** 0.234* 
 
0.622*** 0.898*** 
 
1.386 1.911* 
 
(0.169) (0.135) 
 
(0.215) (0.268) 
 
(1.098) (1.066) 
CDS trading × Ln(Sales) — — 
 
— — 
 
0.214 -0.218 
       
(0.197) (0.196) 
Ln(Sales) 0.238 -0.214 
 
0.595** 0.337 
 
0.389* 0.030 
  (0.403) (0.357)   (0.236) (0.248)   (0.220) (0.200) 
All controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No 
 
Yes No 
 
Yes No 
CEO-Firm FE No Yes 
 
No Yes 
 
No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
N 4588 4588 
 
4588 4588 
 
9176 9176 
Adjusted R2 0.220 0.135   0.214 0.164   0.202 0.126 
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Panel B: Based on analyst coverage 
 
High analyst coverage 
 
Low analyst coverage 
 
Whole sample 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
CDS trading 0.406** 0.269* 
 
0.330* 0.576** 
 
0.438* 0.704*** 
 
(0.176) (0.145) 
 
(0.188) (0.268) 
 
(0.229) (0.250) 
CDS trading × Analyst coverage — — 
 
— — 
 
-0.007 -0.025 
       
(0.015) (0.017) 
Analyst coverage 0.009 0.009 
 
0.015 0.019 
 
0.014* 0.016** 
  (0.010) (0.010)   (0.014) (0.014)   (0.008) (0.007) 
All controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No 
 
Yes No 
 
Yes No 
CEO-Firm FE No Yes 
 
No Yes 
 
No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
N 4536 4536 
 
4572 4572 
 
9108 9108 
Adjusted R2 0.213 0.149   0.244 0.158   0.202 0.127 
                   
 
Panel C: Based on the number of segments 
        
 
High number of segments 
 
Low number of segments 
 
Whole sample
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
CDS trading 0.381* 0.471*** 
 
0.428** 0.297 
 
0.300** 0.235* 
 
(0.208) (0.157) 
 
(0.209) (0.208) 
 
(0.151) (0.130) 
CDS trading × Number of segments — — 
 
— — 
 
0.064 0.068 
       
(0.049) (0.052) 
Number of segments 0.001 -0.003 
 
0.142* 0.102 
 
-0.011 -0.014 
  (0.021) (0.020)   (0.081) (0.081)   (0.016) (0.014) 
All controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No 
 
Yes No 
 
Yes No 
CEO-Firm FE No Yes 
 
No Yes 
 
No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
N 3677 3677 
 
4388 4388 
 
8065 8065 
Adjusted R2 0.234 0.173   0.191 0.154   0.202 0.146 
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Table A.3 
Restricting the sample to the pre-FAS 123R period 
 
This table reestimates our baseline regressions after restricting the sample to the pre-FAS 123R period. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus Vega, where Vega is the change (in thousands of dollars) 
in the value of the CEO’s wealth due to a 0.01 increase in the annualized standard deviation of the firm’s stock 
return. Our main variable of interest CDS trading is an indicator variable that equals one for a CDS firm after 
the inception of the firm’s CDS trading and zero prior to it. We include the same set of control variables as in 
Table 4. The coefficient estimates for control variables are suppressed for brevity. Industry-year effects are 
constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the 
heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Ln(1+Vega) 
 (1) (2) 
CDS trading 0.125 0.148** 
 
(0.110) (0.068) 
All controls Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No 
CEO-Firm FE No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes 
N 1918 1918 
Adjusted R2 0.090 0.116 
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Table A.4 
Firm refinancing needs and the relation between CDS introduction and vega 
 
This table examines whether firm refinancing needs affect the relation between CDS introduction and CEO vega. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus 
Vega, where Vega is the change (in thousands of dollars) in the value of the CEO’s wealth due to a 0.01 increase in the annualized standard deviation of the firm’s stock 
return. Our main variable of interest CDS trading is an indicator variable that equals one for a CDS firm after the inception of the firm’s CDS trading and zero prior to it. We 
include the same set of control variables as in Table 4. The coefficient estimates for control variables are suppressed for brevity. In columns (1) and (2), we exclude firms 
with high refinancing needs. In columns (3) and (4), we include High refinancing needs and its interaction with CDS trading as additional controls. High refinancing needs is 
a dummy variable equals one if ST3 and Book leverage are above the sample median for that fiscal year and zero otherwise, where ST3 is the book value of the debt maturing 
within the next 3 years scaled by the book value of total debt. We obtain the debt maturity information from Capital IQ. Industry-year effects are constructed based on the 
Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Ln(1+Vega) 
 
Excluding firms with high refinancing needs 
 
Controlling for firm refinancing needs 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
CDS trading 0.209** 0.126* 
 
0.322** 0.266** 
 
(0.104) (0.074) 
 
(0.137) (0.105) 
High refinancing needs — — 
 
-0.011 0.019 
    
(0.041) (0.036) 
CDS trading × High refinancing needs — — 
 
0.017 0.065 
    
(0.095) (0.080) 
All controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No 
 
Yes No 
CEO-Firm FE No Yes 
 
No Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
N 7054 7054 
 
9176 9176 
Adjusted R2 0.186 0.134 
 
0.202 0.126 
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Table A.5 
Descriptive statistics for CDS trading-activity variables 
 
This table shows a comparison of our CDS sample to the full DTCC universe. Gross notional is the weekly 
gross notional amount of CDS transactions in US dollars. Number of traded contracts is the weekly number of 
traded contracts. 
 Gross notional (US dollars) Number of traded contracts 
 DTCC Our CDS sample DTCC Our CDS sample 
Mean 93,412,080 138,701,497 19 28 
Median 69,709,111 124,418,974 15 24 
Standard deviation 78,916,837 62,222,922 16 13 
Minimum 2,000,000 21,950,862 1 4 
Maximum 526,097,985 336,023,149 120 68 
5th percentile 17,669,970 59,566,064 4 13 
95th percentile 249,227,640 249,198,823 50 55 
 
